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There is a large literature showing that fiscal policy is either acyclical or 
countercyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing countries. 
Most of this literature is based on OLS regressions that focus on the correlation 
between a fiscal variable (usually the budget balance or expenditure growth) and 
either GDP growth or some measure of the output gap. This paper argues that 
such a methodology does not permit the identification of the effect of the business 
cycle on fiscal policy and hence cannot be used to estimate policy reaction 
functions. The paper proposes a new instrument for GDP growth and shows that, 
once GDP growth is properly instrumented, procyclicality tends to disappear.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
In an influential paper published in 1997, Michael Gavin and Roberto Perotti compared the main 
characteristics of fiscal policy in Latin America with the behavior of fiscal policy in the OECD 
countries. The main finding of Gavin and Perotti’s work was that, when compared with industrial 
countries, fiscal policy in Latin America is volatile and procyclical.  Several other authors have 
corroborated Gavin and Perotti’s (1997) original results, extending them to other developing 
regions, and by now almost no one questions the fact that fiscal policy is procyclical in 
developing countries.
1 Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), for instance, jointly examine the 
procyclicality of capital flows, monetary policy, and fiscal policy, and their results are on the 
whole consistent with those of Gavin and Perotti (1997). In particular, they find that 
macroeconomic policies tend to be either acyclical or countercyclical in industrial countries and 
procyclical in developing countries.  
Given the consensus on the procyclicality of fiscal policies in developing countries,   
recent research has focused on its causes. Gavin and Perotti’s (1997) original contribution argued 
that developing countries find it hard to follow a countercyclical policy because they lack access 
to international credit during recessions, suggesting that any explanation of the procyclical 
behavior documented above needs to keep into account the precarious creditworthiness of 
developing countries.
2 Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) corroborate their results by showing 
that capital flows to developing countries tend to be procyclical. 
A second class of explanations focuses on political rather than market failures. Tornell 
and Lane (1999) describe voracity effects that arise in the presence of various interest groups that 
compete for a share of tax revenues and treat the country’s resources as a common pool. The 
presence of such groups generates procyclicality because, when there is a positive shock to the 
country’s resources, no group will be willing to moderate its claims on the increased resources as 
it knows that the saved resources will be appropriated by another group. Talvi and Végh (2005) 
use a model that assumes that fiscal surpluses will generate political pressures for wasteful public 
spending and show that a benevolent social planner can limit wasteful public expenditure by 
                                                       
1 Gavin and Perotti (1997) also emphasized that the difference between industrial countries and Latin America was 
particularly large during bad times. Some authors found asymmetries in industrial countries, with fiscal policies 
being countercyclical in bad times and acyclical or procyclical in good times (see Balassone and Francese, 2004, and 
Manasse, 2006). We discuss these issues in Section 6. 
2 Riascos and Végh (2003) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) emphasize market incompleteness and 
Alberola and Montero (2006) argue that procyclicality is linked to the perception of sustainability of public debt.    5
decreasing taxes during booms (and hence avoiding accumulating surpluses) and increasing 
taxes during recessions, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) show that this is an optimal behavior in the 
presence of voters with imperfect information and corrupt politicians. Alesina and Tabellini’s 
(2005) empirical analysis is consistent with the main predictions of their model and shows that 
procyclicality is positively correlated with corruption. Calderón, Duncan, and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2004) focus on 20 emerging market countries and also find that procyclicality depends on 
institutional quality (countries with higher levels of institutional quality are less procyclical). 
Akitoby et al. (2004) find that procyclicality tends to be lower in richer countries with less 
concentrated political power, lower institutional quality, and larger public sectors. Braun (2001) 
also finds that public sector size is an important determinant of procyclicality and that transfers 
act as automatic stabilizers and reduce procyclicality. Manasse (2006) finds that fiscal rules tend 
to reduce procyclicality but that this result is not robust to controlling for institutional quality. 
A third possible explanation is that procyclicality occurs because fiscal outlays converge 
over time to a desired level determined by long-run fundamentals and that the speed of 
convergence increases with the distance between desired and actual spending. In this setting, 
procyclicality is generated by the fact that convergence is faster during booms than during 
recessions, suggesting that governments in economies in which public spending is below the 
optimal level are hard-pressed to spend whatever windfall they receive almost immediately 
(Galiani and Levy-Yeyati, 2006). 
In this paper, we move one step back and check whether the standard procyclicality result 
is due to reverse causality. In particular, we recognize that when looking at the correlation 
between GDP growth and macroeconomic policies there is an important endogeneity problem 
and we address this problem with a new instrument for GDP growth.
3 We are not the first to raise 
this issue. Reverse causality was already mentioned by Gavin and Perotti (1997) and was 
explored by Galí and Perotti (2003) in their study of how the Maastricht treaty affected fiscal 
cyclicality in the euro area, and by Rigobón’s (2004) discussion of  Kaminsky, Reinhart and 
Végh (2004). However, we think that this paper is the first to explore the issue in detail and to 
use an instrument that can successfully deal with the reverse causality issue in a large sample of 
countries.  
                                                       
3 We are grateful to Alejandro Micco for suggesting the use of this instrument.   6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 runs a set 
of OLS regression and reproduces the standard result that the correlation between fiscal policy 
indicators and GDP growth is consistent with procyclicality in developing countries and 
countercyclicality or acyclicality in industrial countries. Section 4 discusses the endogeneity 
problem, while Section 5 discusses the validity of our instrument and reports our instrumental 
variable estimations. Section 6 analyzes the cyclicality of fiscal policy in good and bad times, 
and Section 7 concludes. 
   
2.  The Data  
 
We study the cyclical properties of fiscal policy using an unbalanced panel covering 118 
countries over the 1970-2003 period. Our data are drawn from publicly available sources (the 
International Financial Statistics and Government Finance Statistics produced by the 
International Monetary Fund) and focus on central government. Hence, they somewhat differ 
from those of Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004), which are from International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook database (which is not publicly available), and those of Gavin 
and Perotti (1997), which focus on general government and include subnational governments and 
state-owned enterprises.   
 Table 1 describes our main variables, dividing the data into six (sometimes overlapping) 
groups of countries. The main country groups are industrial countries (23 countries for a total of 
456 observations) and developing countries (95 countries for a total of 1514 observations), but 
we also follow Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) and split the developing countries group 
into three groups of countries classified according to their level of income. The middle-high 
income group includes 34 countries (472 observations), the middle-low income group includes 
27 countries (505 observations) and the low income group includes 33 countries (527 
observations).
4 Finally, we also report summary statistics for the sub-sample of 13 Latin 
American countries (200 observations) studied by Gavin and Perotti (1997).  
Focusing on the budget balance, developing and industrial countries look similar (even 
though developing countries have a higher variance). Within developing countries, middle-high 
income countries tend to have the lowest average deficit (about 2 percent of GDP, but this is also 
                                                       
4 We classify countries following a criterion similar to the one adopted by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004). 
Appendix A presents detailed definition of the variables and sources and a list of countries included in each group.   7
the group with the highest variance), and low income countries have the highest average deficit. 
The Latin American sample of Gavin and Perotti (1997) has characteristics similar to those of 
the middle-high income group. The second panel of Table 1 shows that the growth rate of public 
expenditure is higher in developing countries than in industrial countries and it reaches a 
maximum in the group of middle-high income countries. The third panel shows that GDP growth 
tends to be substantially higher in developing countries, a fact that could be partially explained 
by higher populations growth in these countries and by the presence of several fast-growing 
emerging market countries. The table also shows that GDP growth is more volatile in developing 
countries, as is the real external shock summarized in the last panel.
5 
 
3.  Correlation between Fiscal Variables and GDP Growth 
 
As one of the aims of this paper is to challenge the conventional wisdom that fiscal policy is 
procyclical in developing countries, we need to start by showing that our results are not driven 
by the fact that we do not use the same data or the same techniques used in previous studies. The 
objective of this section is thus to show that we can use our data and methodology to reproduce 
the standard results highlighted in the previous literature.  
We start by following Gavin and Perotti (1997) and focus on the budget balance 
expressed as a share of GDP. Next, we recognize Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh’s (2004) 
criticism of this measure and study procyclicality using government expenditure. All our 
specifications follow the standard approach of regressing a fiscal indicator on real GDP growth, 
the change in terms of trade, the lagged fiscal balance, and a set of country fixed effects.
6 
Formally, we estimate the following regression: 
 
t i t i t i t i i t i DEF TOT GR GDP FISC , 1 , , , , _ ε δ γ β α + + Δ + + = −    (1) 
 
where FISC if a fiscal indicator, α is a country fixed effect, GDP_GR is real GDP growth, ΔTOT 
is the percentage change in terms of trade, and DEF is the deficit over GDP.
7  Within this set-up, 
                                                       
5 We describe the construction of the external shock variable in Section 4. 
6 While this approach is rather standard, some authors (notably Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004) do not focus 
on regression analysis but on simple correlations based on detrended series. As our ultimate objective is to run an 
instrumental variable model, we do not focus on simple correlations, but show that equation 1 yields results that are 
comparable with those of Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004).  
7 Other authors measure GDP and the fiscal indicators as deviations from their long-run trend, sometimes using the 
Hodrik-Prescott filter to detrend the original series. As detrending is always problematic (especially in developing 
countries, Aguiar and Gopinath, 2004) and as the two techniques yield similar results, we focus on this simpler   8
the degree of cyclicality of the fiscal variable is usually determined by looking at the sign and 
size of the coefficient β. 
  By running the above regression using as dependent variable the fiscal balance divided 
by GDP, Gavin and Perotti (1997) find that in industrial countries β is positive (with a value of 
approximately 0.37) and statistically significant. However, when the authors focus on Latin 
America, they find that β is close to zero and not statistically significant. They argue that the lack 
of a positive relationship between growth and the fiscal balance suggests that discretionary fiscal 
policies are procyclical because, in absence of such a  procyclical response, the fiscal balance 
would automatically be positively correlated with growth.  
As our dataset is slightly different from that of Gavin and Perotti, we start by replicating 
their results for the overall budget balance. Column 1 of Table 2 focuses on industrial countries 
and finds that β is equal to 0.312 (a bit lower than Gavin and Perotti’s original estimate of 0.368) 
and significantly greater than zero. Column 2 focuses on the same sample of 13 Latin American 
countries studied by Gavin and Perotti and finds that the coefficient is 0.05 and not statistically 
significant (Gavin and Perotti found that the coefficient was 0.04 and not statistically 
significant). While our results are not identical to those of Gavin and Perotti, they are 
surprisingly close to their results (especially given the fact that we use different sources of data 
and focus on a longer period). In particular, we do reproduce the positive and significant 
correlation between GDP growth and budget balance in industrial counties and a smaller and not 
statistically significant correlation in Latin America.
8  
In column 3, we move beyond Latin America and estimate the model for the whole 
sample of developing countries for which we have data. We now find that β is positive and 
statistically significant but its magnitude is less than one third that of industrial countries. 
Furthermore, an F test rejects the null that the coefficient for industrial countries is equal to that 
of developing countries with a p-value of 0.0001. This confirms that industrial countries differ 
                                                                                                                                                                           
specification that does not require estimating a long-run trend. Note that, as we use country fixed effects, all the 
variables are to be interpreted as deviations from their long run average. In other words, our model is equivalent to: 
( ) i t i FISC FISC − , =  ( ) i t i GR GDP GR GDP _ _ , − β  +  ( ) i t i TOT TOT Δ − Δ , γ  +  ( ) t i i t i DEF DEF , 1 , ε δ + − − . 
As we express our variables in terms of growth rate, our technique is equivalent to the use of detrended series based 
on a log-linear trend. 
8 Note that the regressions of Table 2 are potentially biased because of the simultaneous inclusion of fixed effects 
and the lagged dependent variable. When we re-estimated our model using both difference and system GMM   9
from developing countries with respect to their correlation between GDP growth and budget 
balance.  
In the last three columns, we follow Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) and split the 
developing country group into the three subsamples described in the previous section. We find 
that the correlation is the lowest (and not statistically significant) in the sample of middle-high 
income countries, the highest (about half that of industrial countries), and statistically significant 
in middle-low income countries, and intermediate (and marginally significant) in the sample of 
low income countries. These results are somewhat in contrast with those of Kaminsky, Reinhart, 
and Végh (2004), who find that procyclicality tends to reach a maximum in middle-income 
countries. This difference in results may be due to the fact that they focus on a different fiscal 
indicator, an issue to which we turn next.  
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) argue that it is impossible to establish whether 
policies are procyclical or countercyclical by regressing the budget balance over GDP growth.
9 
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estimators for dynamic panels we found similar results. We consequently continue to use the standard model, which 
allows us to better compare the results with the IV estimations of Section 5.  
9 Alesina and Tabellini (2005) suggest that this is mostly semantic.  In particular, while most authors define as 
countercyclical a policy that holds constant the tax rate and discretionary spending as a fraction of GDP over the 
cycle, Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) define such a policy as acyclical.   10
The sign of this equation is clearly positive if the country has a budget deficit (BAL<0), 
but it can be either positive or negative if the country has a budget surplus (BAL>0).
10 Hence, an 











, and we cannot say anything about 
cyclicality by exploring this derivative.  The same criticism could be applied to any attempt to 
measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy by using taxation or using any fiscal variable expressed as 
a share of GDP.   
Based on this discussion, Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) suggest that 
procyclicality should be studied using expenditure growth. This is what we do in Table 3.   
Column 1 focuses on industrial countries and shows that the correlation between expenditure and 
GDP growth is essentially zero (it is negative and not statistically significant), a fact consistent 
with an acyclical or countercyclical fiscal policy. The second column shows that the results are 
unchanged if we exclude the G3 countries (US, Japan and Germany). The third column focuses 
on developing countries and shows that the coefficient is large, positive, and significantly 
different from zero (in fact, it is not significantly different from one). This finding is consistent 
with the presence of a procyclical fiscal policy.  Furthermore, the coefficient is also significantly 
different from that of industrial countries (an F test rejects the null that the coefficients for 
industrial and developing countries are the same), indicating that the two group of countries have 
different correlations between GDP growth and expenditure growth. Column 4 shows that 
procyclicality reaches a maximum in middle-high income countries and tends to be lower in 
middle-low income and low income countries. This is broadly consistent with the findings of 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004), who use different data and different statistical techniques. 
This confirms that the discrepancy between our results and theirs, documented above, was 
indeed due to the fact that we were focusing on the budget balance instead of expenditure 
growth. 
Summing up, the results of Tables 2 and 3 show that our data and econometric techniques 
can be used to reproduce the standard result of countercyclical or acyclical fiscal policy in 
                                                       









Relaxing this assumption would strengthen the results that the budget balance is a poor indicator of the degree of 
cyclicality.    11
industrial countries and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries, with procyclicality 
reaching a maximum in middle-high income countries.  
 
4.  Correlation versus Policy Reaction Function 
 
One problem with the regressions of Tables 2 and 3 is that they could provide an estimation of 
the policy reaction function (and hence a measure of the cyclicality of fiscal policy) only if GDP 
were exogenous with respect to fiscal policy. This point is well illustrated by Rigobón’s (2004) 
comment on Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004).  Rigobon points out that the pattern 
illustrated in the previous section could be due to the fact that developing and industrial countries 
follow different fiscal policies but could also be due to the fact that the shocks that hit 
developing countries are different from those that hit industrial countries. Consider the following 
fiscal policy reaction function: 
 
t t t u by a e + + =      ( 4 )    
 
where e is public expenditure, y is GDP, a and b are parameters to be estimated, and u is a shock 
to public expenditure. In this set up, a procyclical fiscal policy would be associated with a 
positive b and a countercyclical fiscal policy with a negative b.  Note that Equation (4) resembles 
Equation (1), and the interpretation of b in Equation (4) is exactly the interpretation that the 
traditional literature has given to the point estimates of β in Equation (1), i.e., the degree of 
cyclicality of fiscal policy. This would not be a problem if y were exogenous with respect to 
expenditure. However, there is a large literature on Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy which argues that, at least in the short run, fiscal policy does have an effect on GDP 
growth. This relationship can be described as: 
 
t t t v ke m y + + =       ( 5 )  
  
where m and k are parameters to be estimated and v is a shock to GDP.  The parameter k 
measures the effect of fiscal policy on GDP and can take either a positive value (Keynesian 
effect) or a negative value (non-Keynesian effect; see Alesina et al., 2002). It is easy to show that 
Equation (4) is identified and simple estimation of b from Equation (1) can be interpreted as 
fiscal policy parameters only if either k or the variance of  u are equal to zero: 
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Assuming that the fiscal and GDP shocks are uncorrelated (E(vu)=0), we can use Equations (4a) 
and (5a) to write the correlation of  e and y as: 
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and the value of b ˆobtained by estimating Equation (4) as: 
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=       ( 7 )  
Sufficient conditions for e y, ρ  to have the same sign of b are
2
u σ = 0 (i.e., there are no expenditure 
shocks) or k=0 (i.e., simultaneity is not an issue). The same conditions are sufficient to guarantee 
that b ˆ is an unbiased estimator of b ( ( ) b b E = ˆ ).  
If neither of these conditions is verified, two set of countries with identical b, and k (and 
hence the same degree of fiscal cyclicality) but different types of shocks can have different 
correlations between GDP growth and government expenditure. Just to make an example, 
assume, without loss of generality, that two groups of countries follow countercyclical fiscal 
policies (b<0) and that in both groups of countries fiscal policy has a Keynesian effect (k>0) but 
that in the first group of countries GDP shocks dominate fiscal shocks ( u v σ σ >> ) and in the 
second group of countries fiscal shocks dominate GDP shocks ( v u σ σ >> ). Then, in the first 
group of countries we will observe a negative correlation between y and e, and in the second 
group of countries a positive correlation between y and e. Clearly this is not an indication that the 
two countries have different degree of fiscal cyclicality (which, by assumption, is the same in 
both countries). Rigobón (2004) argues that it may indeed the case that in developing countries 
fiscal shocks dominate GDP shocks and in industrial countries GDP shocks dominate fiscal 
shocks. 
   13
5.  Identifying the Policy Reaction Function 
 
The discussion in the previous section does not say anything new, merely restating the well-
known endogeneity problem. However, it does make clear that a fact often interpreted as being 
driven by differences in policy parameters may be purely due to differences in the nature of the 
shocks faced by different types of countries. Estimating the policy parameters of equation 4 
requires an identification strategy that can solve the simultaneous equation problem. Rigobón 
(2004) addresses this issue by exploiting heteroskedasticity in the data and uses the method of 
identification though heteroskedasticity (Rigobón, 2003).  One problem with this approach is that 
lack of heteroskedasticity does not allow providing estimations for all subgroups of countries. In 
this paper, we identify the policy reaction function by using the more standard instrumental 
variable approach.  
The key problem is finding a good instrument. Such an instrument needs to be correlated 
with the variable that needs to be instrumented (GDP growth) and exogenous with respect to this 
variable, as well as have no direct effect on the dependent variable (the fiscal indicator). We 
argue that a real external shock consisting of the weighted average of GDP growth in country i’s 
export partners has these characteristics.  We define the real external shock as: 
 






SHOCK , 1 , , ∑ − = φ    (8) 
 
where GDPGRj,t measures real GDP growth in country j in period t, φij,t is the fraction of export 
from country i going to country j, and EXPi/GDPi measures country i’s average exports 
expressed as a share of GDP. Note that we use a time-invariant measure of exports over GDP  
because a time-variant measure would be affected by real exchange rate fluctuations, and, 
therefore, by domestic factors. This is not the case for the fraction of exports going to a specific 
country (φij,t), because the variation of the exchange rate that is due to domestic factors has an 
equal effect on both the numerator and denominator.  
Our External Shock variable is a refinement of the instrument used by Galí and Perotti 
(2003) in a paper that aims at analyzing fiscal cyclicality in the Euro area. In particular, these 
authors instrument the GDP gap of Euro area countries using the output gap of the United States 
(for the United States, they use the lagged output gap of the main European countries). One 
problem with the instrument used by Galí and Perotti (2003) is that, unlike our external shock, it   14
is not heterogeneous across countries (the instrument for the Italian output gap is the same as the 
instrument for the French output gap) and hence cannot be easily used in a panel set-up like the 
one in Table 3. 
   It is relatively straightforward to show that our external shock variable is not a weak 
instrument and hence it does have the first characteristics for being a good instrument. Table 4 
shows the first-stage regressions of a set of two-stage least square estimations in which GDP 
growth is identified with the external shock of Equation (8). All columns show that the shock 
variable has a positive and highly significant coefficient, with t-statistics ranging between 2 and 
7.9. The sample of low income countries is the one with the lowest coefficient (1.05) and t- 
statistics (2.0), but also in this case the correlation between the external shock and GDP growth 
is significant at the 5 percent confidence level.  The last row of Table 4 reports the Stock and 
Yogo (2002) weak instruments F test (see Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002, for a survey of the 
weak instrument literature).  If we exclude the subsample of low income countries, we find that 
the F-test ranges between 18 (in the sub-sample of middle-high income countries) and 62 (in the 
sample of industrial countries). These values are well above both the Staiger and Stock (1997) 
rule of thumb threshold suggesting that the F test should be above 10 and the tabulated values of 
Stock and Yogo (2002) which suggest a threshold of approximately 14 (given our specification, 
the threshold for a 5 percent significance level and a 0.5 maximum desired bias is 13.91). In the 
subsample of low income countries, instead, we obtain an F statistics of 3.7 which is below the 
critical values identified by Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2002), suggesting that 
the instrument may not be appropriate for this specific subsample.  
Showing that our external shock variable fits the second and third requirements for a 
good instrument (i.e., being exogenous with respect to GDP growth and having no direct effect 
on the dependent variable) is more complicated because this needs to be done on theoretical 
rather than statistical, grounds.  
Let us start with exogeneity. While one may claim that the real external shock is 
endogenous for countries that serve as locomotives for global growth and for which domestic 
growth may affect GDP growth of all of their main trading partners, we do not think that this is a 
serious problem for countries outside the G3 (the United States, Japan and Germany).
11 This is 
because exports to the countries that are influenced by the domestic country shock tend to be a 
                                                       
11 This is why we re-estimate all our equations by dropping the G3 countries.   15
small fraction of the exports of the country that originated the shock. To fix the idea, consider the 
case of Brazil and Uruguay. Clearly, a shock to Brazil’s GDP will have a large effect on the GDP 
of Uruguay, and hence GDP growth in Uruguay will not be a good instrument for GDP growth in 
Brazil, but Uruguay consists of a minuscule share of total exports of Brazil (0.7 percent) and 
hence has almost no weight in Equation (8). Now consider Uruguay as a source country. In this 
case, exports to Brazil have a large weight (16 percent) in Uruguay’s total exports, but a shock to 
Uruguay’s GDP will have basically no effect on Brazil’s GDP and this, again, should reduce 
concerns of reverse causality. One may argue that the case of Brazil and Uruguay is an extreme 
one because it focuses on one very large and one very small country. But the same conclusion 
applies to pairs of medium-size countries. Consider, for instance the case of Italy and France 
(which are each other’s main trading partner), and focus on how a shock that originates in Italy 
affects France and then feeds back to Italy. France’s exports-to-GDP ratio is about 25 percent 
and France;s share of exports to Italy is 9 percent.  As the point estimate of Column 1 of Table 4 
(which applies to industrial countries) is about 2, we obtain that a 1 percent shock to Italy’s GDP 
growth translates into a 0.25*0.09*2=0.045 percent shock to French GDP. Now consider the 
feedback to Italy of this shock (which would be the source of reverse causality). Italy’s export-
to-GDP ratio is also around 25 percent, and Italy’s share of exports to France is 12 percent. 
Hence, we obtain: 0.045*0.25*0.12*2=0.002, which is greater than zero but a minuscule fraction 
(one fifth of a percentage point) of the original shock.       
Let us now discuss possible reasons why the external shock may have an effect on 
expenditure growth which does not go through GDP growth (i.e., a violation of the third 
requirement for a good instrument). First, it is hard to think that the external shock may have a 
direct effect (i.e., an effect not mediated by any other variable) on expenditure growth and, 
hence, this should not be a source of concern. However, one could come up with a complicated 
mechanism through which the external shock has an indirect effect on expenditure growth which 
does not go through GDP growth. Consider, for instance, the case of a country that taxes its 
exports (as some commodity producers do). Then, an increase in exports brought about by the 
external shock may result in an increase of tax revenues which, in turn, may relax government 
budget constraints and lead to higher expenditure.  While this is clearly a possibility, we think 
that in most countries this indirect effect should be either nonexistent (because few countries tax 
exports) or not important quantitatively.  Furthermore, most countries that tax exports only tax   16
commodity exports, and we are directly controlling for this effect by including terms of trade 
shocks in our model. 
Alternatively, a shock to GDP growth in a group of large countries may affect global 
interest rates (for instance, a negative shock in the US and Euroland may lead to lower interest 
rates in these countries), and this may have a direct effect on interest expenditure throughout the 
world. However, this is a legitimate source of concern only when we consider total expenditure 
(which includes interest payment), but we will show that our results are unchanged if we use 
primary expenditure, which does not include interest payments. Finally, one may argue that the 
instrument is inappropriate because it is merely a proxy for some “global factor” that should be 
included in the second-stage regression. We will show that our results are robust to controlling 
for such global factors.    
 
5.1 Instrumental Variable Estimates  
 
Table 5 shows that instrumental variable estimates of the effect of GDP growth on expenditure 
growth yield coefficients that are dramatically different from those of the OLS estimates of Table 
3. In the case of industrial countries, OLS estimates found that β was basically zero, a fact 
consistent with an acyclical policy. On the other hand, instrumental variables estimates suggest 
that the coefficient is large and negative, a finding consistent with a countercyclical policy 
(dropping the G3 countries from the sample, as in column 2, does not affect this result).  In 
column 3, we focus on developing countries and find that, once we control for endogeneity, the 
procyclical behavior suggested by OLS estimates completely disappears.  In fact, we now find 
that we cannot reject the null that the coefficients for industrial and developing countries are not 
significantly different from each other.
12  
Note that the estimates of Table 5 focus on the cyclicality of overall public expenditure 
and include both discretionary expenditures and automatic stabilizers. If we were able to remove 
the effect of automatic stabilizers (which are likely to be larger in industrial countries), we would 
probably find an even smaller difference between the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy in 
both groups of countries.  
                                                       
12 A Wald test with one degree of freedom in the numerator and 1822 degrees of freedom in the denominator, takes 
a value of 1.6 and does not reject the null that the two coefficient are not significantly different form each other with 
a p-value of 0.20.   17
The remaining three columns of Table 5 show that the coefficient for middle-high income 
countries is basically identical to that of the full sample of developing countries and that the 
coefficients for middle-low income countries and for low income countries have different signs 
but are not even close to being statistically significant. This indicates that the acyclical fiscal 
behavior obtained for the full sample of developing countries is not driven by the behavior of a 
specific subsample.  
The results are even more striking if, instead of looking at expenditure growth, we focus 
on the cyclicality of the budget balance (Table 6). In this case, we find that the coefficients for 
both developing and industrial countries are positive (a fact consistent with countercyclicality), 
statistically significant, and of similar magnitude.  
 
5.2  Robustness Checks 
 
Our instrument may not be valid if the business cycle in the large industrial countries directly 
affects interest expenditure in the developing countries. To check whether our results are driven 
by this problem, we now focus on primary expenditure instead of total expenditure. Table 7 
confirms our previous finding that, while OLS regressions suggest acyclicality in industrial 
countries and procyclicality in developing countries, IV estimates show that fiscal policy is 
countercyclical in industrial countries and acyclical in developing countries. In fact, the IV 
coefficient for developing countries is negative, albeit not statistically significant, indicating that 
primary expenditure may indeed be countercyclical, even in developing countries.  
Another possible problem with our instrumental variable approach is the presence of 
global shocks. Suppose, for instance, that a sudden increase in the price of oil causes a global 
recession or that a sudden stop episode (Calvo, 2005) causes a set of correlated crises in a large 
group of emerging markets. Then, our external shock variable would no longer be an appropriate 
instrument because the global shock would lead to a coordination of the business cycle across 
countries, a factor which is not controlled for in our regression. To address this issue, we 
augment our specification with a set of year fixed effects which have the objective of controlling 
for global shocks. Table 8 shows that including year fixed effects drastically changes the result 
for the subsample of industrial countries. The OLS regressions, which in Table 3 indicated 
acyclical behavior, now suggest that fiscal policy is procyclical, and the IV estimates, which in 
Table 5 indicated countercyclical behavior, now suggest that fiscal policy is either acyclical or   18
countercyclical (the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant). In the case of 
developing countries, instead, controlling for year fixed effects does not affect the basic results. 
The OLS regressions still suggest procyclical behavior and the IV regression still suggests   
acyclical behavior. Taken together, these results suggest that once one controls for global shocks 
and for the fact that GDP growth is endogenous there is no difference in the degree of cyclicality 
between industrial and developing countries.   
  
6.  Procyclicality in Good and Bad Times 
 
Another finding of Gavin and Perotti (1997), subsequently corroborated by several other authors, 
is that fiscal policy is asymmetrical in industrial countries but not in developing countries. In 
particular, Gavin and Perotti (1997) find that in industrial countries fiscal policy is 
countercyclical in bad times and acyclical in good times but that the business cycle does not 
affect the degree of procyclicality in Latin America. Along similar lines, Manasse (2006) uses 
non-linear estimations methods to show that, for both industrial and developing countries, fiscal 
policy is acyclical in bad times and procyclical in good times, but those asymmetries tend to be 
larger for industrial countries.   
Interestingly, while the literature that focuses on developing countries has centered on the 
procyclicality problem, highlighting how procyclicality may amplify the business cycle of 
developing countries, the literature that focuses on industrial countries has instead centered on 
the asymmetry problem, highlighting how this may lead to unsustainable fiscal expansions. 
Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), for instance, argue that countercyclicality during bad times 
and acyclicality during good times contributed to the increase in the government expenditures in 
OECD countries during the 1975-1998 period. Along similar lines, Balassone and Francese 
(2004) find that in most European industrial countries the budget deteriorates during contractions 
but does not improve during expansions.  
 Hercowitz  and  Strawczynski  (2004) argue that the endogeneity bias should be the same 
in bad and good times and hence endogeneity should not be a problem when one focuses on the 
difference between fiscal cyclicality in good and bad times. However, the discussion in Section 3 
clearly illustrates that the endogeneity bias is influenced by the relative importance of 
expenditure (u) and GDP shocks (v), and there are good reasons to think that the relative   19
importance of these shocks may vary over the business cycle.  It is thus interesting to study 
asymmetries using our instrumental variable approach.   
In Table 9, we focus on expenditure growth and split the sample into good and bad times, 
with bad times defined as periods in which country i’s GDP growth is below the country’s 
median GDP growth.  The first panel focuses on OLS estimates and shows that in industrial 
countries fiscal policy is asymmetric over the business cycle. In particular, we find that fiscal 
policy is procyclical in good times (the coefficient is positive and statistically significant) and 
either acyclical or countercyclical (the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant) in 
bad times. In contrast, we find no asymmetries in the subsample of developing countries. The 
coefficients are almost identical across sub-periods and consistent with a procyclical fiscal policy 
in both good and bad times (the coefficients are not statistically significant in the subsample of 
middle-low income countries). Again, instrumental variable estimates yield very different 
results. In this case, we find that in industrial countries fiscal policy is either countercyclical or 
acyclical in good times (the coefficient is negative and large but not statistically significant) and 
clearly countercyclical in bad times. In developing countries, we find that the coefficients are 
always large and negative (with small differences between good and bad times) and hence 
consistent with a countercyclical fiscal policy, but never statistically significant.
13  
                                                       
13 These results should be taken with caution because they may suffer from the weak instrument problem. This is 
especially the case in developing countries during good times (the F test ranges between 0.08 and 4.6).    20
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
There is a large literature dating back to Gavin and Perotti (1997) that argues that fiscal policies 
tend to be countercyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing countries and that 
this difference in procyclicality is due to the fact that industrial countries can adopt expansionary 
fiscal policies during recessions.  
The objective of our paper was to test whether these results are due to different degrees of 
cyclicality in fiscal policy or are due to the fact that developing countries receive different types 
of shocks. We find that while OLS estimates reproduce the standard result first highlighted by 
Gavin and Perotti, this result disappears once GDP growth is properly instrumented for. In fact, 
our instrumental variable estimations suggest that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing and industrial countries.  
A greater understanding of the causes of these different correlations is important for 
policy purposes. If these correlations result from difference in policies, then any solution to this 
problem should focus on removing the constraints (either due to political or market 
imperfections) that lead policymakers to adopt procyclical policies. However, these policies may 
be misguided (or at best useless) if the observed correlation between GDP growth and fiscal 
variables is due to the different nature of the shocks rather than to different policy reaction 
functions.   21
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
















LAC          
(GP SAMPLE)
Mean  -3.50 -3.15  -2.02  -2.78 -4.56  -2.24 
Median  -2.72 -2.65  -1.75  -2.32 -4.09  -1.72 
BUDGET 
BALANCE 
St. Dev.  4.05 4.80  5.29  3.68 4.99  3.81 
Mean  2.85 3.36  3.43  3.53 3.15  3.56 
Median  2.62 3.80  4.11  3.50 3.58  3.74 
EXPENDITURE 
GROWTH 
St. Dev.  4.75 16.19 12.48 14.92  19.99  13.74 
Mean  2.59 3.35  3.66  3.30 3.12  2.75 
Median  2.68 3.79  4.21  3.64 3.49  3.49  GDP GROWTH 
St. Dev.  2.21 4.54  5.05  4.45 4.17  4.94 
Mean  0.77 0.86  1.13  0.83 0.62  0.59 
Median  0.70 0.69  0.96  0.70 0.50  0.56 
EXTERNAL 
SHOCKS 
St. Dev.  0.55 0.74  0.95  0.63 0.51  0.42 
Observations  456 1514  472  505 527  200 
Countries  23 95  34  27 33  13 
 
 
Table 2. Cyclical Properties of the Budget Balance 
 
















GDP GROWTH  0.312 0.052  0.094  0.063  0.159 0.073 
  (0.051)***  (0.042) (0.027)*** (0.049)  (0.036)***  (0.044)* 
ΔTOT  7.817 0.546  4.529  11.083 3.093 3.064 
  (3.557)** (1.785)  (1.092)***  (3.031)***  (1.495)**  (0.932)*** 
LDEF  -0.207 -0.350  -0.551  -0.495  -0.515 -0.669 
   (0.031)*** (0.067)***  (0.064)***  (0.076)***  (0.064)*** (0.043)*** 
Observations  456  200 1514 472 505  527 
Countries  23 13  95  34  27 33 
R
2  0.2252  0.1819 0.3185 0.3287 0.301  0.3549 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Outlier observations for Bolivia (1982-1986) and Sri Lanka (1980-1982)  were dropped. For Low Income 
Countries, the observations that have residuals with absolute value greater than 2.5 standard deviations in 
the first stage of the IV estimates first stage  (Table 4) were dropped. All regressions include country fixed 
effects. 
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Table 3. Cyclical Properties of Expenditures 
 

















LAC         
(GP SAMPLE)
GDP 
GROWTH  -0.007 -0.016  0.907  1.162  0.629  0.760  1.084 
  (0.136) (0.146)  (0.098)***  (0.140)*** (0.138)***  (0.215)***  (0.223)*** 
ΔTOT  -18.355  0.169 -12.283  -22.646  1.049 -12.201  -0.253 
  (5.722)*** (0.107)  (5.368)** (6.710)*** (5.011)  (4.565)***  (8.920) 
LDEF  0.168 -20.696  0.912  0.553  1.306  1.245  0.984 
   (0.103) (7.071)***  (0.142)***  (0.111)*** (0.196)***  (0.209)***  (0.259)*** 
Observations  450 398 1495  473  483  529 184 
Countries  23  20 94  34  26 33  12 
R
2  0.0394 0.0415  0.1190  0.1950  0.1142  0.1192 0.2256 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Outliers observations for Bolivia (1982-1986) and Sri Lanka (1980-1982)  were dropped. For Low Income 
Countries, the observations that have residuals with absolute value greater than 2.5 standard deviations in 
the IV estimates first stage  (Table 4) were dropped. All regressions include country fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 4. First Stage for IV Estimates 
 














SHOCK  1.969 1.742  1.592  2.132  1.054 
  (0.249)***  (0.260)***  (0.373)*** (0.466)*** (0.519)** 
Observations  450 1495  473  483  529 
Countries  23 94  34  26  33 
R
2  0.1820 0.0444  0.0567  0.0897  0.0283 
 
F-test for the 
instrument  62.62 44.88  18.20  20.95  3.68 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Outlier observations for Bolivia (1982-1986) and Sri Lanka (1980-1982)  
were dropped. For Low Income Countries, the observations that have residuals with 
absolute value greater than 2.5  standard deviations were dropped. The first stage includes 
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Table 5. Cyclical Properties of Expenditures, IV Estimates 
 

















GDP GROWTH  -0.840  -0.818 0.009  0.013  0.156 -2.294 
  (0.272)*** (0.290)***  (0.501)  (0.623)  (0.647)  (2.963) 
ΔTOT  -15.790  0.187 -12.562 -22.688  2.871 -15.594 
  (6.044)***  (0.082)**  (3.123)***  (6.728)*** (7.011) (6.335)** 
LDEF  0.186 -17.511  0.959  0.472  1.396  1.631 
   (0.079)** (7.115)** (0.109)*** (0.137)*** (0.252)***  (0.448)*** 
Observations  450  398  1495 473  483 529 
Countries  23  20 94  34  26 33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Outlier observations for Bolivia (1982-1986) and Sri Lanka (1980-1982)  were dropped. For Low Income 
Countries, the observations that have residuals with absolute value greater than 2.5 standard deviations in 
the IV estimates first stage  (Table 4) were dropped. All regressions include country fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 6. Cyclical Properties of Budget Balance, IV Estimates 
 

















GDP GROWTH  0.585  0.583  0.453 0.310 0.389  1.491 
  (0.106)***  (0.114)***  (0.116)*** (0.181)* (0.122)***  (0.830)* 
ΔTOT  6.997  9.046  4.619 11.094 2.179 4.642 
  (2.351)***  (2.813)***  (0.726)*** (1.941)***  (1.305)*  (1.885)** 
LDEF  -0.210  -0.2149  -0.572 -0.478 -0.564  -0.851 
   (0.030)***  (0.032)***  (0.025)*** (0.040)*** (0.048)***  (0.130)*** 
Observations  456  399  1514 472  505 527 
Countries  23  20  95 34 27  33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Outlier observations for Bolivia (1982-1986) and Sri Lanka (1980-1982)  were dropped. For Low Income 
Countries, the observations that have residuals with absolute value greater than 2.5 standard deviations in 
the IV estimates first stage  (Table 4) were dropped. All regressions include country fixed effects.   26
Table 7. Robustness Analysis: Primary Expenditure Growth 














OLS  -0.032 1.006  1.241  0.789  0.900 
  (0.121) (0.113)***  (0.158)***  (0.163)***  (0.256)*** 
IVREG  -0.888 -0.283  -0.541  0.277  -2.209 
  (0.288)*** (0.661)  (0.964)  (0.804)  (3.418) 
Obs.   417  1066 397  358 303 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1%.  
The OLS and IV regressions, include the same set of controls used in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 8. Robustness Analysis: Controlling for Global Factors 














OLS  0.321 0.961  1.192  0.665  0.900 
  (0.151)** (0.099)***  (0.148)***  (0.139)*** (0.223)*** 
IVREG  -0.231 0.708  0.012  0.740  -3.022 
  (1.000) (0.629)  (1.005)  (0.632) (16.919) 
Obs.   450  1495 473  483 529 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1%.  
The OLS and IV regressions, include the same set of controls used in Table 5. Global 
factors are controlled for by including year fixed effects 
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Table 9.Cyclicality of Expenditures in Good and Bad  Times, IV Estimates  
 















1.145 0.909  0.998  0.304  1.135  Good Times 
(0.411)*** (0.211)***  (0.264)***  (0.326)  (0.479)** 
-0.120 0.973  1.299  0.481  1.053  Bad Times 
(0.233) (0.227)***  (0.255)***  (0.407)  (0.446)** 
IV 
-1.687 -1.955  -0.987  -3.172  -4.017  Good Times 
(1.543) (3.954)  (2.277)  (3.821)  (12.980) 
-2.971 -1.565  -0.429  -0.175  -12.061  Bad Times 
(1.496)** (1.052)  (1.146)  (1.623)  (7.595) 
Observations 
Good Times  226 744  235  240  264 
F test  GT  10.67 4.61  3.79  2.25  0.08 
Bad Times  222 735  233  243  254 
F test BT  7.87  31.14  14.09  10.77  2.08 
Countries 23  94 34  26  33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.  
The OLS and IV regressions, include the same set of controls used in Table 5.    28
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
BUDGET 
BALANCE 
Central Government revenues and grants minus 
expenditures and lending.  GFS + IFS 
EXPENDITURE 
GROWTH 
Real Central Government total expenditures growth in 
local currency units.  GFS + IFS 
GDP GROWTH  Real GDP growth in local currency units.  WDI 
EXTERNAL 
SHOCKS 
Weighted average of GDP growth in country’s export 
partners, weighted by share of partner in total exports.  DOTS 
TERMS OF 
TRADE 
(Real Imports/Nominal Imports)/ 




Total Central Government expenditure minus interest 
expenditures.  GFS + IFS 
Acronyms: GFS, Government Finance Statistics (IMF). IFS, International Finance Statistics (IMF). DOTS, 
Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF). WDI, World Development Indicators (World Bank).   
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Table A2. Countries in the Sample 
 








LOW INCOME COUNTRIES  
(33) 
Australia Argentina  Algeria  Bangladesh 
Austria  Bahrain, kingdom of  Bolivia  Burkina Faso 
Belgium Barbados  Bulgaria  Burundi 
Canada Belize  Colombia Cameroon 
Denmark Botswana  Dominican  Republic  Chad 
Finland  Brazil  Ecuador  Congo, Republic of 
France  Chile  Egypt  Cote d ivoire 
Germany  Costa Rica  El salvador  Ethiopia 
Greece Croatia  Fiji  Gambia,  the 
Iceland Cyprus  Guatemala  Ghana 
Ireland Czech  Republic  Honduras Guinea-Bissau 
Italy Estonia Indonesia  Haiti 
Japan Gabon  Iran  India 
Malta Grenada  Jamaica Kenya 
Netherlands Hungary  Kazakhstan  Lesotho 
New Zealand  Israel  Morocco  Madagascar 
Norway Korea  Paraguay  Malawi 
Portugal Kuwait  Peru  Mali 
Spain Latvia  Philippines  Mongolia 
Sweden Lithuania  Sri  lanka  Namibia 
Switzerland  Malaysia  St. Vincent & Grens.  Nicaragua 
United Kingdom  Mauritius  Swaziland  Nigeria 
United States  Mexico  Syria  Pakistan 
   Oman  Thailand  Papua New Guinea 
   Panama  Tunisia  Rwanda 
   Poland  Turkey  Senegal 
   Saudi Arabia  Vanuatu   Sierra Leone 
   Seychelles     Solomon Islands 
   Slovak Republic     Tanzania 
   South Africa     Togo 
   St. Kitts and Nevis     Uganda 
   Trinidad and Tobago     Zambia 
   Uruguay     Zimbabwe 
   Venezuela, Rep. Bol.       
 